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Abstract
The human brain can learn contingencies built into stimulus sequences unconsciously. The quality of such implicit learning has
been connected to stimulus social relevance, but results so far are inconsistent. We engaged participants in an implicit-intentional
learning task in which they learned to discriminate between legal and illegal card triads on the sole basis of feedback provided
within a staircase procedure. Half of the participants received feedback from pictures of faces with a happy or sad expression
(social group) and the other half based on traffic light icons (symbolic group). We hypothesised that feedback from faces would
have a greater impact on learning than that from traffic lights. Although performance during learning did not differ between
groups, the feedback error-related negativity (fERN) was delayed by ~20 ms for social relative to symbolic feedback, and the P3b
modulation elicited by infrequent legal card triads within a stream of illegal ones during the test phase was significantly larger in
the symbolic than the social feedback group. Furthermore, the P3bmean amplitude recorded at test negatively correlated with the
latency of the fERN recorded during learning. These results counterintuitively suggest that, relative to symbolic feedback,
socially salient feedback interferes with implicit learning.
Keywords Implicit learning . Social feedback . Event-related potentials . P3b . fERN
Humans can learn contingencies about their environment
without conscious awareness. Such phenomenon is classically
observed in the case of statistical learning, when dependencies
between linguistic stimuli, for instance, are extracted by the
brain without the participants’ intention to acquire them
(Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Such form of spontaneous
and unconscious learning is observed across a variety of per-
ceptual domains. In the auditory domain, for example, studies
have shown that infants implicitly use language patterns to
rapidly segment words from speech streams (Aslin, Saffran,
& Newport, 1998; Saffran, 2003), and this phenomenon ex-
tends even beyond linguistic stimuli (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin,
& Newport, 1999). Statistical learning occurs spontaneously
(Fiser &Aslin, 2001), rapidly (Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, &
Johnson, 2009), and without the need for explicit instruction
(Fiser & Aslin, 2002). This has led to the proposal that statis-
tical learning results in the formation of implicit knowledge
(Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005;
Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Reber, 1967).
Implicit learning refers to the process of learning the under-
lying rule of a system (e.g., an artificial grammar) solely based
on exposure to stimulus contingencies and probabilities (Reber,
1967). Just like statistical learning, implicit learning is thought
to be unconscious, meaning that participants are unable to
verbalise a rule that they have acquired (Reber, 1989) and are
not aware that they have learnt something (Cleeremans,
Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, &
Goode, 1995; Seger, 1994). For example, evidence from the
serial reaction time task suggests that people identify previously
viewed light sequences more quickly than novel sequences
(Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989; Chun & Jiang, 1998).
One limitation of much work within this literature is that the
nature and quality of learning is measured by participant perfor-
mance or metacognitive evaluations after learning. In the
problem-solving domain, for example, implicit memory of a
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puzzle improves problem solving on a subsequent task, even
when participants are given a concurrent task to exert strain onto
the working memory system (Reber, 1989; Reber & Kotovsky,
1997). The results of such studies appear to be contingent upon
the type of task used to determine whether learning was implicit
(Shanks & Channon, 2002; Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). Thus,
the extent to which the process is truly unconscious remains
debatable. Still, when participants perform above chance after
training, although they believe that they are merely guessing
the answers, one may presume that the learning was mostly
unconscious and that their knowledge is implicit (Dienes et al.,
1995). Shanks and St. John (1994) have questioned how much
post-learning tests (e.g., asking participants to verbalise a rule that
they have acquired) tell us about the nature of the learning pro-
cess. More specifically, they enquired whether tests of perfor-
mance and awareness are sensitive enough to measure the ac-
quired knowledge that has become conscious and whether
knowledge awareness can really be assessed before the nature
of the knowledge itself has been determined. It seems that classic
implicit learning tasks lack precision regarding the nature of what
participants learn when the conclusions are solely drawn from
performance indices, e.g., reaction time (Eimer, Goschke,
Schlaghecken, & Stürmer, 1996) or post-learning verbalisations
(Shanks & St John, 1994).
One way to obtain unbiased evidence of implicit learning is
to measure spontaneous brain activity modulations elicited by
learned contingencies. Event-related potentials (ERPs), a meth-
od derived from electroencephalography, are averaged record-
ings of brain activity measured at the surface of the scalp elic-
ited by series of repeated stimuli. ERPs can be recorded inde-
pendently of performance indices and index unconscious infor-
mation processing in the absence of any behaviourally measur-
able effect (Thierry & Wu, 2007; Wu & Thierry, 2010).
Baldwin and Kutas (1997) showed that participants engaged
in an artificial grammar learning task (without any explicit in-
struction regarding underlying rules) produced P300 ERP re-
sponses of larger amplitude for correct grammatical forms than
incorrect ones. This result shows that participants developed
expectancies about the sequences they viewed and were able
to detect rule violations, even though they seemed unable to
consciously access this information at debriefing (Van Zuijen,
Simoens, Paavilainen, Näätänen, & Tervaniemi, 2006). Similar
effects have even been shown in cases where rule learning was
not embedded within the experiment but rather occurred from
natural exposure to language. For example, Vaughan-Evans
et al. (2016) recently showed that the brains of individuals with
no recorded or overt knowledge of an ancient form of Welsh
poetry (Cynghanedd) successfully identified correct forms from
sentences violating composition rules, despite being unable to
detect the correct forms in overt judgement tasks. Presumably,
these participants learned the rules of Cynghanedd implicitly,
through natural language exposure and required no conscious
knowledge.
One important dimension of the human learning environ-
ment that seems to have been neglected in the implicit learning
literature is the social quality of the information people learn,
even though it is reasonable to assume that feedback during
learning would vary in efficiency depending on its social sig-
nificance. Information from and about other humans is abun-
dant in the environment, and even the mere presence of others
has long been suggested to facilitate performance on simple
tasks (Bond & Titus, 1983; Zajonc, 1965; Zajonc,
Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). More recent research has sug-
gested that reliable social cues allow others to implicitly pre-
dict their behaviour, e.g., in a game of rock-paper-scissors
(Heerey & Velani, 2010). Social cues, such as smiles and
frowns, can aid performance during associative learning com-
pared with nonsocial Btraffic light^ feedback (i.e., Bsymbolic^
feedback; Hurlemann et al., 2010). These findings suggest that
socially relevant information is processed by the same asso-
ciative system that underlies other types of reward-based
learning (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008).
However, during cognitively demanding tasks, participants
avert gazing at faces, and the frequency of this avoidance
relates to task difficulty (Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner,
Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder, &
Robertson, 1998). Thus, social information appears to add a
cognitive load during difficult tasks and participants sponta-
neously resort to gaze averting in order to reduce this load
(Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005).
Nevertheless, there is a distinction between learning that
occurs within a social context (Glenberg et al., 1998; Heerey
& Velani, 2010) and learning that results in a socially charged
outcome, e.g., when socially relevant information conveys
feedback about performance (Turnbull, Bowman, Shanker,
& Davies, 2014). In the latter case, there is some indication
of a facilitatory effect on performance in associative tasks
(Hurlemann et al., 2010); however, it is unknown how perfor-
mance is affected in tasks that require implicit contingency
learning. We presented participants with triads of cards featur-
ing coloured shapes, varying in four possible ways (shape
type, colour, number of shapes, and filling) and asked them
to indicate which triads were Blegal^ combinations and which
were Billegal,^ according to a rule that was never described.
Participants were thus engaged in an implicit-intentional
learning task, in which they were instructed to proceed on a
trial-and-error basis. We labeled this context as intentional,
because participants were aware of the need to extract some
kind of rule, even though they did not know this rule. This task
context notably differs from the incidental context that usually
applies in classical implicit learning. They received feedback
on every trial, completing the learning phase only when they
had met a predetermined learning criterion applied via a stair-
case procedure (described in Procedures section). Participants
received feedback with either faces or a traffic light display.
Given their high social-relevance and the fact they have been
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shown to increase performance in associative tasks
(Hurlemann et al., 2010; Mihov et al., 2010), we hypothesised
that faces as feedback would boost performance during learn-
ing and result in higher accuracy in a subsequent test phase.
Crucially, to collect an objective and spontaneous marker of
learning, we recorded ERPs throughout the two phases of the
experiment and monitored: (a) the participants’ physiological
reaction to feedback (indexed by the feedback error-related
negativity, fERN) during the learning phase, and (b) their
spontaneous response to infrequent legal card combinations,
presented amongst frequent illegal ones (as indexed by the
P3b modulation elicited by infrequent stimuli in an oddball
paradigm) during the test phase. Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, we expected that face stimuli would elicit greater fERN
amplitudes during learning and thus lead to greater mean P3b
amplitudes at test.
Methods
Participants
Fifty-five Bangor University students (27 females; Mage =
21.6, SD = 3.7) were recruited to participate via the
university’s participant panel and received course credit as
compensation. Of these participants, 27 (15 females; Mage =
22.4, SD = 4.8) received social feedback, and 28 (12 females;
Mage = 20.9, SD = 1.9) received symbolic feedback during the
learning phase of the experiment. Experimenters were blind to
feedback condition when instructing participants in the learn-
ing phase. All participants provided written, informed consent
to take part in the study, which was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the School of Psychology at Bangor University.
We excluded four individual datasets from all analyses be-
cause of excessive time spent on, or failure to complete, the
learning phase (see criterion in Procedure below). We further
excluded 4 datasets of the remaining 51 from analysis for the
learning phase and a different 4 of 51 for the test phase;
datasets were included on the basis of a sufficient number of
trials to analyse being present. Thus, the final samples for
statistical analysis in the learning phase was 47 (24 social,
13 females; 23 symbolic, 11 females) and 47 (23 social, 14
females; 24 symbolic, 11 females) for the test phase.
Stimuli
Eighty-one cards each featuring a unique combination of one
to three shape(s) (circle, square, triangle), in one of three col-
ours (red, green, blue), with one of three fillings (empty,
hashed, full) were used to create card triads that either com-
plied or not with the following rule: A legal combination is a
triad of cards in which all cards are the same or different,
considering each of the stimulus dimensions separately
(shape, number, colour, filling). Any combination of cards
featuring a partial repetition of any stimulus dimension was
thus illegal (Fig. 1). Card triads were further split into four
difficulty levels based on the perceived difficulty in assessing
legality, e.g., a combination of cards failing the all same/all
different criterion for all four dimensions was consid-
ered relatively easy to spot as illegal (cf. illegal difficulty
level 1 in Fig. 1).
The number of possible card combinations differed be-
tween difficulty levels (e.g., illegal level 1:1 combination, il-
legal level 4: 32 possible combinations). In the learning phase,
the weighting of each combination was adjusted to ensure that
each level had equal probability of being presented throughout
the staircase procedure to allow participants to learn about
combinations from all of the levels. During the test phase,
however, we elected to present difficulty levels at their
Bnatural^ frequency, and legal and illegal conditions were pre-
sented with a ratio of 1:3 to comply with the oddball design.
Fig. 1 Examples of legal and illegal card triads split by levels of
difficulty. Note that full repetition triads (same shape, S, number, N,
colour, C, and filling, F) were not used in the experiment, because they
were too simple to identify. The code under each triad indicates the
particular properties that comply with the rule: black slim letters code
for a dimension repeated across all three cards, black bold letters code
for dimensions different across all three cards, and grey letters indicate
dimensions for which the all same/all different rule is violated
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Card triads were presented under 4 degrees of visual angle
in the learning phase and under less than 2 degrees of visual
angle in the test phase, that is, in participants’ foveal visual
field to avoid eye saccades and consequent artefacts. Note that
no ERPs were analysed in response to card triads in the learn-
ing phase.
Feedback: Twelve pictures of faces (6 females, 6 males)
each presented with a happy, neutral, or sad expression were
collated from The Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces data-
base (KDEF: Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998; Goeleven,
De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008) and edited to fit
within 2 degrees of visual angle. Six simple shapes (circle,
square, triangle, hexagon, diamond, trapezoid) were drawn
to fit the same surface as that covered by faces and coloured
in green, orange, or red in two different levels of luminance as
a counterpart to the two genders for faces (6 dark, 6 light).
Procedure
Learning phase Participants first completed an implicit-
intentional learning task. On each trial, a card triad randomly
selected from a database of card combinations was presented
in the middle of a 19^ CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 74
Hz. Legal and illegal combinations had equal probability of
presentation as did levels of difficulty. Participants had to in-
dicate whether the current combination was Blegal^ or
Billegal^ by pressing designated buttons on an SR response
box (E-Prime 2.0 software; Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). Participants started on a random response
basis. In the symbolic group, feedbackwas provided bymeans
of shapes filled in one of two colours (green, correct; red,
incorrect). Thus, the symbolic feedback stimuli shared some
perceptual similarity with the card stimuli (i.e., some shapes
and some colours), but the colour scheme of the symbolic
feedback was semantically transparent (green for correct and
red for incorrect) and binary, thus entirely unambiguous
whereas the shapes and colours presented on cards had no
intrinsic meaning and were completely arbitrary. In the social
group, participants received feedback from pictures of faces
with one of two different emotional expressions (smile, cor-
rect; sad, incorrect).
Before the feedback stimulus, a neutral stimulus (orange
shape in the symbolic group and neutral face in the social
group) was displayed with a pseudorandom variable duration
(750-950 ms in steps of 40 ms). The neutral stimulus served to
focus the participant’s attention in the centre of the screen
(thus avoiding eye movements) and desynchronised the
fERN response elicited by the subsequent valenced feedback
stimulus from the ERP elicited by the card triad.
Participants progressed through a staircase procedure such
that they had to make five correct cumulative judgements for
each level of difficulty in each legal and illegal condition
before triads from that level and condition were dismissed
from training (Fig. 2). Any error reset the count of correct
trials to zero for the current level of difficulty and condition.
Response side was counterbalanced across participants.
Testing phase After completing the learning phase, partici-
pants were asked in a second phase to indicate whether each
card triad presented was legal or illegal without feedback.
Each triad was presented for a maximum duration of
1,500 ms and response initiated the next triad presentation
after an inter-stimulus interval of 450-550 ms (in steps of 25
ms) during which a fixation cross then appeared in the centre
of the screen. The random interstimulus interval was intro-
duced to reduce cross-trial ERP contamination (Fig. 3).
There were three blocks of 200 trials and participants were
given the chance to rest between each block. Legal trials were
presented with an average frequency of 25% (range 23–26%)
and were expected to act as deviants amongst frequent illegal
triads, thus conforming to the structure of a classic oddball
paradigm prone to eliciting P3b ERP effects.
Fig. 2 Structure of a trial on the staircase learning procedure. After presentation of the card triad, participants received one of two types of feedback:
symbolic (left) or social (right), preceded by a neutral stimulus in all cases
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EEG recording and analysis
EEG data were recorded continuously at a sampling rate of
1 kHz in reference to CZ using 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes at-
tached to an elastic cap (Easycap™, Herrsching, Germany)
and arranged according to the extended 10-20 convention.
EEG signals were ampli f ied using SynAmps2™
(Neuroscant™ Inc., El Paso, TX). The ground electrode was
placed at FPz. Four additional electrodes were placed to the
right of the right eye and to the left of the left eye (HEOG) and
above and below the right eye (VEOG) to monitor horizontal
and vertical eye movements. Impedances were kept below 5
kΩ. Recordings were filtered online between 0.01 and 200 Hz
(slope 24 db/Oct.).
The EEG data were filtered offline using a zero-phase shift
bandpass digital filter between 0.1 Hz [24 db/Oct]–25 Hz [48
db/Oct] using Scan 4.5 (Neuroscan™ Inc.). Major artefacts
were manually rejected, and eye blinks were mathematically
corrected according to the procedure described in Gratton,
Coles, and Donchin (1983). Continuous EEG activity was then
segmented into epochs ranging from 100 to 1000 ms after stim-
ulus onset for the learning phase and −200 to 1,000 ms for the
testing phase. A shorter baseline window was selected in the
learning phase to minimise baseline contamination by the pre-
ceding neutral stimulus cue. Baseline correction was performed
in reference to prestimulus activity, and individual averages
were digitally re-referenced to the global average reference.
In the learning phase, the average number of feedback trials
included in the symbolic condition was 43.48 (SEM= 4.64) and
45 (SEM = 8.20) in the social condition. As for the test phase,
only accurate trials were kept for the analysis, leading to an
average of 381.54 (SEM = 12.97) trials in the symbolic condi-
tion and 346.48 (SEM = 14.89) trials in the social condition.
The ERPmodulation of interest in the learning phase was the
feedback error-related negativity (fERN), which is typically
maximal over frontocentral electrodes and typically peaks be-
tween 200-320 ms (Ma, Meng, & Shen, 2015; Miltner, Braun,
& Coles, 1997; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). We thus analysed
fERN mean amplitude at FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, and C2 be-
tween 200–320 ms—the predicted time-windows based on pre-
vious studies. fERN peak latency was fixed in each condition
and each participant and measured at the electrode of minimum
amplitude FCz where the fERNwas most negative (Picton et al.,
2000). As for the test phase, rare legal stimuli were expected to
elicit larger P3b amplitudes than frequent illegal stimuli. P3b
mean amplitudes were analysed over the predicted centroparietal
region (C1, CZ, C2, CP1, CPZ, CP2, P1, PZ, P2) between 480-
580 ms where it is classically analysed in tasks requiring elabo-
rate cognitive processing (Kok, 2001; Polich, 2007).
Statistical analyses
Behavioural and ERP results were analysed using mixed de-
sign ANOVAs with legality (illegal, legal) as repeated-
measures factors and feedback condition (social, symbolic)
as a between-groups factor. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections
were applied when necessary, and df and p values reported
are adjusted.
Results
Learning phase
Performance Because speedy responses were not encouraged,
we did not analyse reaction times in the learning phase.
Fig. 3 Trial structure of the test phase. Participants were required to respond on every trial using the SR box provided. Response side counterbalanced
across participants
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Analysis of accuracy showed a main effect of legality, F(1,49)
= 15.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.245, but no main effect of feedback
condition or interaction (p ≥ 0.819). Participants responded to
legal combinations significantly more accurately than illegal
ones (MLegal = 0.73, SD = 0.12; MIllegal = 0.66, SD = 0.10).
fERN In order to analyse the fERN, a difference waveformwas
computed by subtracting the grand average positive feedback
waveform from the negative feedback waveform (Miltner
et al., 1997; Scheffers & Coles, 2000). There was no main
effect of legality or feedback condition on mean fERN ampli-
tude, nor significant interaction between the two (p ≥ 0.228).
However, there was a significant main effect of feedback
condition on fERN peak latency, F(1,45) = 5.879, p = 0.019,
η2p = 0.116. There was no main effect of legality or interaction
between legality and feedback condition (p ≥ 0.560).
Therefore, we collapsed mean latencies across legality and
tested feedback condition using an independent samples t test
and found a significant difference, t(45) = −3.08, p = 0.004, d
= 0.90, confirming the previous result (Fig. 4).
Test phase
Performance In terms of reaction times, there was a main
effect of legality F(1,49) = 6.89, p = 0.012, η2p = 0.123, with
participants responding more quickly to illegal (MIllegal =
786.92, SD = 136.23) than legal cards (Mlegal = 822.10, SD =
150.60). However, there was not a main effect of feedback con-
dition, nor an interaction (p ≥ 0.538). Similarly, with accuracy,
we found a significant main effect of legality F(1,49) = 4.33, p =
0.043, η2p = 0.081, but all other effects were nonsignificant (p ≥
0.588), with participants responding more accurately to illegal
(MIllegal = 0.64, SD = 0.16) than legal cards (Mlegal = 0.55, SD =
0.20), regardless of feedback condition (Fig. 5).
P3b There were significant main effects of legality, F(1,45) =
30.29, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.402, and feedback condition, F(1,45) =
10.49, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.189, on P3b mean amplitudes. There
also was a significant interaction between the two, F(1,45) =
11.04, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.197. A simple effects analysis showed
that the difference in amplitude between illegal (standard) and
legal (deviant) trials was significant in the symbolic, F(1,45) =
39.80, p < 0.001,η2 = 0.457, but not the social feedback group,
F(1,45) = 2.33, p = 0.134,η2 = 0.027 (Fig. 6).
Across testing phases: P3b and fERN
Finally, in a subset of participants (N = 43) whose datasets
were retained for both learning and test phases, we predicted
that as the latency of the fERN increases, the difference
Fig. 4 Effect of feedback condition on the fERN (negativeminus positive
feedback). (a) fERN mean latencies by feedback condition. (b) Grand-
average ERP difference waveforms elicited over the frontocentral region
(linear derivation of FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, and C2) in the symbolic
(black line) and social (grey line) conditions. (c) fERN topographies (200-
320 ms) by feedback condition. *p < 0.05
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between the oddball and standard stimuli (P3b effect) would
decrease. We suggest that a delay in processing hindered feed-
back registration in the learning phase and lead to a weaker
ERP response discriminating between illegal and legal stimuli
at test. Analysis showed that there was indeed a significant
negative correlation between these variables, r(41) = −0.27, p
= 0.039, R2 = 0.07 (1-tailed), in the absence of an interaction
with group, p > 0.1 (Fig. 7).
Discussion
In the present study, we compared two groups of participants
learning a new card game and receiving two different types of
feedback: symbolic or social. We investigated the effect of
feedback type on performance during learning and at test,
using behavioural and ERP measures. In the learning phase,
participants were more accurate overall for legal than illegal
a b
Fig. 5 Behavioural results in the test phase: (a) reaction time and (b) accuracy, both collapsed across feedback condition. Error bars represent
SEM. *p < .05
Fig. 6 P3b Results. (a) Mean P3b amplitudes between 480-580 ms elic-
ited over the centroparietal region (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz,
P2) by legal (grey) and illegal (black) card triads in the symbolic (left) and
social (right) feedback groups. Error bars indicate SEM. (b) P3b ERP
waveforms elicited over the centroparietal region by legal (grey) and illegal
(black) in the symbolic (left) and social (right) feedback groups. (c) P3b
effect (legal minus illegal) topography by feedback group. ***p < 0.001
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card triads, regardless of feedback type. Although we did not
find any difference in mean ERP amplitude between groups,
the fERN elicited by socially salient stimuli was significantly
delayed (by ~20 ms) compared with that elicited by symbolic
feedback, regardless of card triad legality. At test, participants
showed greater accuracy for illegal than legal card combina-
tions, suggesting that learning in the training phase had taken
place. Furthermore, when collapsing across legality, par-
ticipants in both groups displayed similar levels of ac-
curacy, meaning that feedback type did not cause mea-
surable differences in general performance. This being
said, ERP differences between groups did manifest at
test. Even though the paradigm we used was a non-
traditional P3b design (i.e., participants were required
to respond to all stimuli) a typical P3b effect was elic-
ited in response to infrequent legal compared with fre-
quent illegal stimuli in the symbolic group, while the
social group failed to show a mean amplitude difference
between conditions in the same time window. Finally,
we found a correlation between fERN peak latency in
the learning phase and P3b mean amplitude at test.
We expected socially salient feedback to enhance task
performance (as suggested by results obtained by
Hurlemann et al., 2010) but failed to find behavioural
differences between participant groups. Nonetheless,
brain responses differed between groups in both the
learning and the testing phase, with the symbolic group
displaying earlier fERN peaking time than the social
group, as well as a significant P3b effect. Thus, whereas
both groups learned the rule of the game to a similar
extent, ERP measures indicate that the quality of learn-
ing differed depending on feedback type. This interpre-
tation is consistent with the finding of a negative corre-
lation between fERN latency and P3b amplitude: the
greater the delay of negative feedback registration, the
weaker the subsequent distinction between legal and il-
legal stimuli.
Thus, although feedback type does not differentially
affect behavioural performance, socially relevant feed-
back appears to add cognitive noise affecting learning
at the neurophysiological level. In that sense, the results
echo those reported by Hu et al. (2015), who asked
participants to sort 3-digit numbers according to arbi-
trary categories and gave feedback via either socially
relevant (emotionally expressive faces) or symbolic
(traffic light icons) stimuli. The authors found that so-
cial feedback impaired performance relative to symbolic
feedback and that those learning via social feedback
performed at comparable levels of accuracy as those
learning based on symbolic feedback only after receiv-
ing a dose of intranasal oxytocin. The authors reasoned
that the relative disadvantage afforded by emotional
faces could be due to this stimulus type not being a
customary form of feedback in Chinese culture. In other
words, Chinese participants find emotive human faces
disruptive during learning. Because we found a similar
effect in our ERP data, the relative advantage of sym-
bolic feedback may extend to western cultures. This
effect may be explained by facial stimuli increasing
cognitive load during difficult tasks (as in Doherty-
Sneddon et al., 2002), which is consistent with other
studies showing improvements in accuracy when partic-
ipants avert the gaze from socially relevant stimuli dur-
ing cognitive tasks (Glenberg et al., 1998; Phelps,
Doherty-Sneddon, & Warnock, 2006). This result also
concurs with the classic finding that the presence of
others during cognitively demanding tasks can be detri-
mental to task performance (Bond & Titus, 1983). It is
noteworthy that we used six different identities in the
social feedback condition, thus incurring stimulus vari-
ability to a greater extent than that involved in the sym-
bolic feedback group, given that symbolic feedback only
varied in basic geometrical properties and lightness. The
relatively greater diversity of stimuli in the social
feedback version of the experiment therefore may have
contributed to increasing the cognitive load in that
condition and thus partly account for the pattern of
difference found in the ERP data. Indeed, Hu et al.
(2015) reported that using an emoticon instead of pho-
tographs of faces as feedback in the social feedback
condition improves learning.
Note that the sharing of attributes between the shapes pre-
sented on cards and those used to provide feedback in the
Fig. 7 Relationship between fERN mean latency and P3b effect mean
amplitude. Negative correlation between fERN mean latency and P3b
effect (legal minus illegal) mean amplitude
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symbolic participant group could hardly account for this re-
sult. Symbolic feedback sometimes featured circles or
squares, which could be green or red, attributes that could be
represented in some cards. Whereas the semantic value of the
symbolic shapes was entirely based on colour, unambiguous
(i.e., green = correct, red = incorrect), and binary in nature, the
shape and colour attributes of shapes on cards were entirely
arbitrary and only had value when considered across cards.
Indeed, there was no detrimental effect of the overlap in attri-
butes between card shapes and symbolic feedback shapes,
thus not causing any measurable consequences in this study.
Our task deliberately engaged spatial and abstract-reason-
ing capabilities. Thus, it was cognitively demanding,
which may explain why we did not find social feedback
to have a facilitatory effect on task performance but
rather tend to cause shallower learning, indexed by
P3b amplitudes. We provided electrophysiological evi-
dence that socially salient feedback—when the task at
hand is abstract and relatively complex—is less condu-
cive to facilitating implicit learning, as evidenced by a
delayed fERN. Participants in this feedback group also
showed a reduced P3b effect, reflecting a decreased
ability to distinguish between rare legal stimuli and
more frequent illegal stimuli. Our results thus support
recommendations that during difficult cognitive tasks,
people should avoid looking at other individuals to in-
crease task accuracy (Phelps et al., 2006). However,
future research is needed to generalise this finding to
other learning contexts (e.g., socially relevant tasks)
and investigate whether it is the social quality of the
stimuli or its informativeness in the task context that
affects learning quality on the neurophysiological level.
We employed a type of negative social feedback different
from that used in previous studies (Hu et al., 2015; Hurlemann
et al., 2010; Mihov et al., 2010). The latter experiments used
Bangry^ faces as negative feedback in social conditions,
whereas we elected to use Bsad^ faces. One could argue that
sadness does not convey negative feedback in response to an
error in learning contexts as efficiently as frowning or anger.
This may have resulted in a slightly different emotional con-
text, thus limiting the validity of direct comparisons between
studies.
Another point to note was the use of unequal number
of possible combinations of the four shape dimensions
per level of difficulty at test (see Stimuli section). In the
learning phase, we ensured that the different combina-
tions had equal probability of presentation to offer par-
ticipants a chance to learn all possible combination
types. However, during the test phase, we allowed the
combinations to occur at their natural frequency. For
example, there are many possible combinations of ille-
gal trials in which the rule is violated for one stimulus
dimension only compared with the case of violations
affecting all dimensions simultaneously. Future studies
will determine whether the local frequency of each dif-
ficulty level has a measurable impact on detecting legal
combinations amongst illegal ones. Indeed, once a rule is
learned, it is unclear how the diversity of test stimuli affects
performance, because the criterion acquired during the learn-
ing phase is binary in nature.
Conclusions
This study investigated the role of feedback during an
implicit-intentional learning task. Contrary to our hypotheses
drawn from previous behavioural studies, we found that sym-
bolic feedback was more effective than social feedback, as
demonstrated by a delayed fERN in the social group during
learning, and lower ability to distinguish between card com-
binations that complied to an implicitly learnt rule and those
that did not at test, as indexed by a neurophysiological index
of target detection (P3b).We suggest that the social salience of
feedback may interfere with the learning process, at least
when the rule to be learnt is abstract and relatively complex.
Such effects need to be further investigated in experiments
directly manipulating task complexity in social versus nonso-
cial feedback context and characterise the importance of the
type of social feedback received.
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